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I. INTRODUCTION
In April, 1991, the Washington Supreme Court issued an
opinion in what the casual reader might consider to be a case
raising only a technical question concerning workers compen-
sation laws. The case, Cark v. Pacifcorp,1 concerned the
Department of Labor and Industries' right to reimbursement
for benefits paid to an injured worker from a recovery made by
the injured worker in a suit against a party other than the
worker's employer. The court held that the department did
not lose that right to reimbursement merely because it was
determined, in the suit brought by the worker, that the
employer had also been at fault in the accident that caused the
injuries.2 The decision precludes what otherwise would have
been opportunities for disasterous raids on the Workers Com-
pensation Fund. The statements made in the opinion concern-
ing the process of negotiation of settlements for tort law suits
were, however, much broader than necessary for resolution of
the technical question presented. They appear to have signifi-
cance for the negotiation of settlements in all tort suits involv-
ing more than one defendant. Their presence in the opinion,
like leaves left in a tea cup, provides a basis for predicting the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. The author expresses appreciation
of the receipt of summer research support from the University of Washington Law
School Foundation for the preparation of this Article.
1. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991) (the cases of Clark v. Pacificorp and
Whitten v. Assoc. Bldg. Components, Inc. were consolidated for appeal in this case.
Clark v. Pacificorp, 116 Wash. 2d 804, 808, 809 P.2d 176, 179 (1991)).
The Washington Supreme Court's original opinion in this case was printed in the
Washington Supreme Court Official Advance Sheets. See Clark v. Pacificorp, 116
Wash. 2d 804, 809 P.2d 176 (1991). The court omitted that opinion from Volume 116 of
Washington Reports pending a motion for reconsideration. The revised opinion was
published on February 7, 1992. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162
(1991). The revisions concern the manner in which the department should pay
benefits reducing its right to reimbursement.
2. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 183-92, 822 P.2d 170-75 (1991).
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course that the negotiation of claims involving more than one
defendant may take in the future.
This Article first reviews what a study of the 1986 Tort
Reform Act reveals to be problems created by that Act for
negotiators of settlements in tort suits. These problems are
greatest for fault-free plaintiffs. Next, a summary of the previ-
ous law governing joint and several liability provides an under-
standing of these problems and the changes negotiators should
make in their negotiation stategies. The court's success in
avoiding the mandated disaster for the Workers Compensation
Fund raises the possibility that the court may also provide
fault-free plaintiffs with an easier escape from the perils and
pitfalls created by the Act for the negotiation of settlements
with multiple defendants. The likelihood, however, is that the
court will not provide that escape. It therefore becomes appro-
priate to analyze carefully the statements made by the court
concerning the negotiation process to ascertain their applica-
tion to other situations. It is also appropriate to suggest how
the law governing negotiation of tort cases involving multiple
defendants should develop.
II. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY BEFORE THE
1986 TORT REFORM ACT
For present purposes, an adequate description of the
Washington law of joint and several liability is set out in two
decisions of the Washington Supreme Court.3 In Seattle-First
National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete,4 the court rejected the
argument that adoption of the principle of comparative negli-
gence required abandonment of the rule of joint and several
liability. In the course of its opinion, the court briefly summa-
rized the law governing joint and several liability.
The court first noted that tortfeasors had long been held
liable for all the harm proximately caused by their tortious
conduct.5 This principle applied both to joint tortfeasors (those
who acted in common or breached a joint duty) and to those
whose independent acts concurred to produce an indivisible
3. See Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete, 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d
1308 (1978), and Glover v. Tacoma General Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230
(1983). See also Cornelius J. Peck, Washington's Partial Rejection and Modificiation
of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 235-39
(1987).
4. 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
5. Id. at 234, 588 P.2d at 1312.
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injury.6 The indivisibility of the harm caused, combined with
the goal of providing full compensation to an injured party,
allowed the injured party to seek full recovery from any one,
or from all tortfeasors.7 Problems of fairness among multiple
tortfeasors were considered to be different from problems of
fairness to the injured party.'
Fairness among multiple tortfeasors was provided by the
1981 statute establishing contribution among joint or concur-
rent tortfeasors.9 The basis for contribution among persons
who were jointly and severally liable was the comparative fault
of each person.10 The right to contribution could be enforced
either in the original action brought against the joint
tortfeasors or in a subsequent suit against them by a party who
had paid more than its equitable share of the joint obligation."
Settlements were encouraged by the statute's provision that a
settlement relieved a settling tortfeasor from all liability for
contribution. 2 The claim of the releasing party against other
tortfeasors was reduced by the amount paid pursuant to the
settlement agreement, unless the amount paid was unreasona-
ble at the time of the agreement.'
3
The law provided for a presettlement determination of
whether the amount to be paid was reasonable.' 4 If such a
determination was not made and the amount paid was not suf-
ficient, the statutory language established that the releasing
party bore the loss of a reduced recovery from the remaining
tortfeasors; on the other hand, the statutory language estab-
lished that the remaining tortfeasors were the beneficiaries if
the settling tortfeasor paid more than his equitable share. The
Washington Supreme Court's decision in Glover v. Tacoma
General Hospital '" provided a list of factors to be considered in
determining whether the settlement amount was reasonable.' 6
6. Id. at 235, 588 P.2d at 1312.
7. Id. at 236, 588 P.2d at 1312-13.
8. Id.
9. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, §§ 9-14 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015-
4.22.080 (1989)).
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1989).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.050 (1989).
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1989).
13. Id.
14. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1989).
15. 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983).
16. Id. at 717-18, 658 P.2d at 1236; for a list of the reasonableness factors from the
Glover decision, see infra note 26.
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III. THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE 1986 TORT REFORM ACT
In 1986, I was privileged to serve as chair of a committee
appointed by the insurance commissioner of the State of Wash-
ington to review and evaluate the changes made in Washing-
ton's tort system by the 1986 Tort Reform Act. In addition to
the commissioner and the chair, the committee consisted of six
attorneys and two nonlawyers. Three of the attorneys special-
ized in representing plaintiffs in tort litigation; the other three
specialized in defending against tort actions. As might be
expected, the attorneys' opinions diverged in their appraisal of
the wisdom of the 1986 Act's substantive changes. The attor-
neys were, however, in substantial agreement that the Wash-
ington State Legislature had created a number of problems by
accepting the Act as drafted. Those problems must not have
been foreseen. It is nearly impossible to believe that the legis-
lature or its draftpersons intended to create some of the diffi-
culties for practitioners and judges revealed by studying the
statutory language.17
One of the committee's concerns was that a major provi-
sion of the 1986 Act would seriously complicate settlements in
cases involving multiple defendants and fault-free plaintiffs."8
That provision is now found in Revised Code of Washington
(RCW) 4.22.070.1' It provides that in all actions involving fault
17. For discussions of the problems, see Thomas Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort
form Act: Partial Tort Settlements After the Demise of Joint and Several Liability,
22 GONZ. L. REv. 67 (1986-1987); Peck, supra note 3.
18. REPORT OF THE TORT REFORM COMMITTEE To THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER
OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ON THE 1986 TORT REFORM ACT 32 (1987) [hereinafter
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S REPORT] (this report was subsequently submitted by the
commissioner to the members of the 50th Legislature on January 15, 1987).
One of the defense attorneys on the committee may not have shared this concern
because he believed that the legislature should have abolished all joint liability. Id. at
35. If there were no joint liability, there would be reason for delaying settlement with
one of a number of tortfeasors because settlement with that party could safely proceed
on the basis of what that party could and should pay.
19. The statutory provision is as follows:
§ 4.22.070. Percentage of fault - Determination - Limitations
(1) In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of fact
shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every
entity which caused the claimant's damages, including the claimant or person
suffering personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants, third-
party defendants, entities released by the claimant, entities immune from
liability to the claimant and entitites with any other individual defense against
the claimant. Judgment shall be entered against each defendant except those
who have been released by the claimant or are immune from liability to the
claimant or have prevailed on any other individual defense against the
claimant in an amount which represents that party's proportionate share of
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of more than "one entity," the trier of fact shall determine the
percentage of the total fault attributable to every entity that
caused a claimant's damages. Judgment shall be entered
against each defendant for that defendant's proportional share
of a claimant's total damages. Thus, a plaintiff receives no
judgment for shares of damages attributable to entities not
joined as defendants and receives no compensation for those
portions of the losses suffered.
The section further provides that liability shall "be several
only and shall not be joint."20 The Act provides an exception
for cases in which the trier of fact determines that the claim-
ant was not at fault. The focus of attention in this Article is on
that exception.
For cases in which a plaintiff is at fault and the liability of
the defendants is "several only," the Act created few negotia-
the claimant's total damages. The liability of each defendant shall be several
only and shall not be joint except:
(a) A party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for
payment of the proportionate share of another party where both were acting
in concert or when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party.
(b) If the trier of fact determines that the claimant or party suffering bodily
injury or incurring property damages was not at fault, the defendants against
whom judgment is entered shall be jointly and severally liable for the sum of
their proportionate shares of the claimants total damages.
(2) If a defendant is jointly and severally liable under one of the exceptions
listed in subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of this section, such defendant's rights to
contributions against another jointly and severally liable defendant, and the
effect of settlement by either such defendant, shall be determined under
RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060.
(3)(a) Nothing in this section affects any cause of action relating to hazardous
wastes or substances or solid waste disposal sites.
(b) Nothing in this section shall affect a cause of action arising from the
tortious interference with contracts or business relations.
(c) Nothing in this section shall affect any cause of action arising from the
manufacture or marketing of a fungible product in a generic form which
contains no clearly identifiable shape, color, or marking.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989).
20. The legislature used the word "several" at this point in the statute with a new
meaning when compared with prior law. Under prior law, a joint tortfeasor's several
liability was for the total amount of a plaintiff's damages. For the purpose of this
portion of the statute, the word, "several," means only that tortfeasor's proportionate
share of the plaintiff's total damages.
To further confuse the terminology, the legislature gave a different meaning to
the same word in subsection (1)(b). As used in that subsection, the word "several"
means that if a plaintiff is free from fault, a joint tortfeasor should be liable for the
total amount of the judgment entered against all of the defendants. This approximates
the meaning the word had under the prior law, except that the liability does not
include shares of the plaintiff's total damages that have been allocated to unjoined
entities, to defendants who have been released by the plaintiff, to defendants who have
an immunity from liability, or to defendants who have prevailed on any other defense.
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tion complications. Negotiation of those cases may proceed
with little regard for the effect a settlement would have on
claims against other potential defendants. The inquiry focuses
on determining the defendant's share of the total fault and the
amount that the defendant can pay.2'
Cases involving fault-free plaintiffs are much more compli-
cated. The statutory language appears to limit joint and sev-
eral liability of multiple defendants to cases in which a trier of
fact has determined that the claimant was not at fault.22 There
is no statutory language providing for that joint and several lia-
bility without such a finding.
In addition, the statutory language seems to require that a
judgment be entered to establish joint and several liability.
This conclusion is supported by the provision establishing
rights to contribution between defendants. The provision is
limited to those defendants whose liability has been estab-
lished pursuant to one of the section's specific exceptions to its
general rule of several liability.23 This restriction of the right
to contribution suggests that only those against whom a judg-
ment for joint and several liability has been entered have such
a liability. Persons with such a liability have need for contri-
bution, but for persons whose liabilities are established under
the Act, there is no other provision for contribution. Specifi-
cally, there is no provision for contribution among persons who
21. There are unresolved questions concerning the effect of a settlement in an
amount either larger or smaller than a defendant's proportional share of a claimant's
total damages upon the claims against other severally liable defendants. Peck, supra
note 3 at 254; Harris, supra note 17 at 76-77. It appears, however, that the amount paid
in settlement of the claim against one tortfeasor with a several liability is irrelevant in
determining the several liabilities of other tortfeasors. There is no direction requiring
such consideration in determining the liabilities of other severally liable parties.
Pursuant to the statutory language, their liability remains "... an amount which
represents that party's proportionate share of the claimant's total damages." WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1989). Likewise, there is no provision for contribution
between defendants with only a several liability. It thus appears that the question for
a settling claimant in reaching an agreement is whether the parties have agreed on a
correct estimate of the share of the tortfeasor's fault based on separate liability. The
question is not whether the amount received is the correct amount for that share of
the total damages suffered.
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989).
23. RCW 4.22.070(2) provides for contribution between persons who are jointly
and severally liable under subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b) of the section. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.070(2) (1989). Subsection (1)(a) provides for joint and several liability of persons
who acted in concert or who acted as an agent or servant. In addition to the exceptions
from several liability in subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) of RCW 4.22.070, subsection (3)
provides that nothing in the section shall apply to cases involving hazardous wastes,
business torts, or generic products. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1989).
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have settled before judgment.' The provision concerning con-
tribution thus supports a conclusion that a fault-free plaintiff
can establish the joint and several liability of multiple defend-
ants only by obtaining a judgment against all of them. A set-
tling defendant who plans to seek contribution from joint
tortfeasors should insist upon a judgment.
If this is a correct understanding of the changes made by
the 1986 Tort Reform Act, the settlement of claims of parties
free from fault was enormously--one might say, disastrously-
complicated by the legislation. For example, assume that a
passenger involved in an automobile accident has valid claims
against several drivers, an automobile manufacturer, and even
a city or state government. Prior to the Act, a claim against a
driver who had no means of responding other than an insur-
ance policy might reasonably have settled within the limits of
that policy. If the amount of the settlement was determined to
be reasonable, the effect of the settlement was to reduce the
claim against the other defendants by only the amount
received in the settlement.25
In contrast, if joint and several liability exists under the
Act only when such liability has been established by a judg-
ment, a party free from fault who settled on the basis of policy
limits prior to suit and judgment will lose the opportunity to
recover that portion of the claim beyond the limits of the
insurance policy from the other financially responsible
tortfeasors. This results because, as noted before, the Act pro-
vides for exclusion from a judgment of joint and several liabil-
ity of the total share of a claimant's damages allocable to a
released defendant.
For the same reasons, it would be unwise for a fault-free
plaintiff to make a reduction in settling a claim against one of
a number of potential defendants before trial because of doubts
24. The 1986 Tort Reform Act amended RCW 4.22.030 to read, "Except as
otherwise provided in RCW 4.22.070, if more than one person is liable to a claimant on
an indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm, the liability of such persons
shall be joint and several." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070 (1989). This suggests a
possibility that joint and several liability has been preserved for cases that are settled
without entry of a judgment. However, RCW 4.22.070 appears to be ".... an exception
that has all but swallowed the rule." Harris, supra note 17, at 73. RCW 4.22.030 now
appears to apply only to those cases totally excluded from coverage by RCW
4.22.070(3). Those are cases involving hazardous wastes, business torts, and generic
products. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(3) (1989).
25. Glover v. Tacoma General Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 711, 658 P.2d 1230, 1232
(1983).
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concerning that person's liability. If it was determined in the
subsequent trial against the other defendants that the person
with whom the settlement was made was liable, the uncom-
pensated damages allocable to that person would not be
included in a judgment of joint and several liability entered
against these remaining defendants. For similar reasons, it
would be unwise for a fault-free plaintiff to release a party
who had no assets and could not be expected to respond to a
judgment. Despite the fact that the party is judgment proof, it
is in the plaintiff's interest to join and retain that party as a
defendant until judgment is entered.
Under the law prior to adoption of the 1986 Tort Reform
Act, a fault-free plaintiff could recognize factors such as finan-
cial inability to respond and doubts concerning liability when
entering into a settlement with one of multiple tortfeasors
prior to trial. That recognition might have resulted, in some
cases, in the reduction of what was considered to be the value
of the claim against that tortfeasor. If the amount of the set-
tlement was "reasonable," the fault-free plaintiff suffered no
loss, even though the amount agreed upon was less than that
tortfeasor's share of the total damages based on allocations in
proportion to fault.26
Under the 1986 Act, despite the parties' efforts to deter-
mine a settling defendant's degree of fault and share of dam-
ages, if the settlement is less than the share allocated in a
subsequent trial, the plaintiff will lose the difference. In addi-
tion, because the settling tortfeasor has been released from lia-
bility, he or she will have no incentive to contest the size of
that allocation. That burden will fall on the plaintiff.
As noted above, fault-free plaintiffs will be subject to a
reduction in the amount of a judgment because of an allocation
of fault to an "entity" that has not been joined as a defendant.
It is, therefore, amazing that the statute contains no definition
26. In Glover, the court listed factors that are proper considerations for a trial
judge in determining whether a settlement was reasonable. These include:
[Tihe releasing person's damages; the merits of the releasing person's liability
theory; the merits of the released person's defense theory; the released
person's relative faults; the risks and expenses of continued litigation; the
released person's ability to pay; any evidence of bad faith, collusion or fraud;
the extent of the releasing person's investigation and preparation of the case;
and the interests of the parties not being released.
Id. at 717-18, 658 P.2d at 1236 (quoting Brief of Amicus). See also Luanne Coachman,
Comment, A Nonsettling Defendant's Perspective on Reasonableness Hearings Under
Washington's 1981 Tort Reform Act, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 725 (1988).
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of what an "entity" is. The statutory language makes it clear
that an entity includes, but need not be, a defendant or a party
to the law suit. Presumably an entity must be something capa-
ble of the fault that will be assigned to it; therefore, entities
should not include inanimate objects or forces of nature. They
are probably what were previously recognized as legal entities.
Another deficiency of the Act is that it does not state
when an entity must be identified. At present, there does not
appear to be any general court rule fixing the time at which
entity identification shall be made. Therefore, a danger lurks
for fault-free plaintiffs in that the identification and allocation
of an entity could be made too late for joining that entity as a
defendant.' This risk may lead some fault-free plaintiffs to
join all persons and parties who were capable of fault as
defendants, thus avoiding the risk of having damages assigned
to these persons as entities.
Anecdotal information suggests that some attorneys repre-
senting fault-free plaintiffs have allegedly attempted to avoid
losses in prejudgment settlements by agreeing with a potential
defendant not to enforce or execute a judgment later entered
against that person. The strategy is to keep the party with
whom the agreement is reached as a defendant until judgment
is entered. The plaintiff hopes that this will prevent deduction
of that party's share of damages from the total damages for
which all defendants will be jointly and severally liable. The
party with whom the agreement is made will have a contrac-
tual right precluding enforcement of the judgment against
him. Moreover, RCW 4.22.070(2) provides that a defendant
who has satisfied a judgment has a right to contribution to be
determined pursuant to RCW 4.22.060. Subsection (2) of that
provision states that receipt of a "covenant not to enforce judg-
ment, or similar agreement" discharges a person from all lia-
bility for contribution.2"
This scheme is imaginative, but it will probably fail to
obtain its objective. It assumes that a contract not to execute is
27. On November 7, 1991, the Washington Supreme Court published proposed
changes in Court Rule 8 and Court Rule 12. See CT. R. 8, 12 (Proposed Official Draft
1991) (located at 118 Wash. 2d cxxxi, 818 P.2d xcv, xcvi). The effect of these changes
will be to make allocation of fault to a nonparty an affirmative defense to be pleaded
by a defendant claiming that such an allocation should be made. Id. For an additional
discussion of the problems raised by allocations of fault to "entities," see Peck, supra
note 3, at 243-49.
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1989).
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not a release within the meaning of RCW 4.22.070(1). RCW
4.22.060 refers to "a release, covenant not to sue, covenant not
to enforce judgment, or similar agreement" as being inter-
changeable for the purpose of determining the effect of a set-
tlement agreement. That section was amended in 1987, 9
giving rise to an inference that the meaning of the word "set-
tlement" in the 1986 Act should include a settlement made by
a covenant not to enforce or execute.
Moreover, before the statute establishing a right to contri-
bution was enacted, the court refused to accept recitals of a
document s° in determining whether it was a release or a cove-
nant not to sue. This frustrated the attempts of claimants set-
tling with one tortfeasor to keep alive the claim against other
joint tortfeasors. Those cases suggest that a court will treat a
contract not to execute as a release or settlement under RCW
4.27.070, in spite of recitals stating that an agreement is only a
contract not to enforce a judgment.
Fault-free plaintiffs are not the only parties with reasons
for avoiding prejudgment settlements. A "deep pocket"
defendant may not want to settle regardless of how certain it is
that it is subject to some liability. Pursuant to the Act, joint
and several liability exists only if a trier of fact determines
that the claimant was "not at fault." Apparently, a determina-
tion that the claimant bears only one percent of the total fault
would be sufficient to deprive that claimant of a joint and sev-
eral recovery.3 ' Accordingly, deep pocket defendants may have
29. 1987 Wash. Laws ch. 212, § 1901(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.60(1)
(1989)).
30. Haney v. Cheatham, 8 Wash. 2d 310, 318, 111 P.2d 1003, 1006 (1941); Rust v.
Schlaitzer, 175 Wash. 331, 336, 27 P.2d 571, 573 (1933).
31. An interesting but unresolved question is whether a plaintiff is entitled to a
jury instruction concerning the consequence under the 1986 Tort Reform Act of
finding the plaintiff responsible for any fault. Prior to adoption of comparative
negligence, juries were instructed that a finding of contributory negligence was a bar
to recovery. Poole's Seed & Implement Co. v. Rudene, 117 Wash. 150, 155, 200 P. 1104,
1106 (1921); Akin v. Bradley Eng. & Mach. Co., 51 Wash. 658, 662-63, 99 P. 1038, 1040
(1909). Currently, under the doctrine of comparative fault, juries are instructed to
determine the degree of fault attributable to a claimant. If a special verdict form is
used, the jury is instructed that the judge will make an appropriate reduction in the
claimant's recovery. If a special verdict has not been ordered, the jury is instructed
that it should make such a reduction. Perhaps these instructions are more easily
understood than an instruction concerning joint and several liability. An instruction
concerning the effect of a finding of fault on the part of the plaintiff might be
considered so complicated that it would confuse a jury, and therefore, should not be
given. I shall forego the opportunity to attempt a resolution of the question within
this Article.
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a great incentive to avoid settlement until determinations of
fault are made. If the plantiff is found to have been at fault,
the "deep pocket" defendant will escape liability for the shares
of damages attributable to other defendants and entities.
IV. THE WORKERS COMPENSATION CASE
The recent Washington Supreme Court decision in Clark
v. Pacificorp32 has added to the problems and uncertainties
created by the statute concerning settlement negotiations. It
offers enigmatic but important indications that the process of
negotiating settlements will become more complicated than
originally suggested by analysis of the statutory language. One
indication is that future settlement negotiations involving mul-
tiple defendants will be more formal and will be more likely to
require judicial action.
Clark involved two separate workers compensation cases.
These cases addressed the effect of a finding of fault on the
part of an employer in a tort law suit brought by an injured
worker against a party other than the worker's employer. The
question was whether the Department of Labor and Industries
lost its "lien," or its right to be reimbursed for benefits it paid
a worker from the amount recovered in the third party suit.
Thus, the cases raised an apparently narrow and technical
question under workers compensation laws. The significance
of statements made in the opinion for problems of settling tort
claims outside the workers compensation context might, there-
fore, be overlooked.
The question of the effect on the department's lien pursu-
ant to a finding of employer fault arose because of unsatisfac-
tory drafting of another provision of the 1986 Tort Reform
Act.33 That provision added a new paragraph to the Industrial
Insurance Act that related to third party tort suits. The para-
graph reads:
(f) If the employer or a co-employee are determined under
32. 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991).
33. Washington's Industrial Insurance Act provides the exclusive remedy against
an employer for a worker injured in the course of employment. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 51.04.010 (1989). The only exception is for injury resulting from the deliberate
intention of the employer to produce the injury. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (1989).
The Act does provide, however, that an injured employee may seek damages from a
third person, not in the worker's same employment, who is liable for the injury.
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030 (1989). Such a suit is commonly referred to as a third
party tort suit.
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RCW 4.22.070 to be at fault, (c) and (e) of this subsection do
not apply and benefits shall be paid by the department and/
or self-insurer to or on behalf of the worker or beneficiary
as though no recovery had been made from a third party.'
Subsection (c) establishes the "lien" or right to reimburse-
ment. It provides for payment to the department or a self-
insurer, out of a third party recovery, of the amount of the
compensation and benefits the department or self-insurer has
paid to an injured worker. Subsection (e) provides that if the
third party recovery is in excess of the compensation and bene-
fits paid, no further worker benefit payments shall be made
until the amount of the benefits that would otherwise have
been paid equal that excess.
The inadequacies of Washington's legislative history make
it impossible to state with certainty why the legislature made
this change in the Act when it enacted the 1986 Tort Reform
Act. A good guess is that it was expected to ameliorate the
consequences the Tort Reform Act imposed on injured work-
ers by limiting the recoveries possible in their third party tort
suits. The limitation comes about because RCW 4.22.070(1)
requires an allocation of fault to an entity even though it is
immune to suit by the claimant. Such an allocation due to
employer fault has the effect of reducing the damages recov-
ered by an injured worker in a third party tort suit by an
amount proportional to the fault of his or her immune
employer. Probably, the new paragraph was added to soften
the injured worker's loss by allowing him or her to keep the
third party recovery without dimunition by the amount of the
department's lien. This could have been accomplished at no
cost to many of the proponents of the 1986 Act,' and it could
have been expected to reduce opposition to adoption of the
Act.
In any event, as written, the provision appears to provide
for the complete loss of the department's lien without consid-
eration of the proportion of the employer's fault. Moreover, as
enacted, the 1986 Tort Reform Act made no provision for noti-
fication to the department or self-insurers that an employer
had been designated an entity to which fault should be allo-
cated. Thus, the department or a self-insurer might be
34. WAsH. REv. CODE § 51.24.060(1)(f) (1989).
35. See Wallace M. Rudolph, The Tort Crisis: Causes, Solutions, and the
Constitution, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 659 n.3 (1988).
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deprived of a lien without opportunity to contest the allocation
of fault proposed between an injured worker and a third party
defendant. The absence of a requirement of notice that fault
might be allocated to an employer strengthens the proposition
that the legislature in 1986 had no concern over the depart-
ment's total loss of the right to reimbursement.
Although this notification defect was promptly corrected,3'
loss of reimbursement still affected an employer's experience
rating, resulting in higher worker compensation premiums
than otherwise would have been required. The possibilities for
collusion between the plaintiff and defendant in a third party
tort suit against the interests of the department and insured
employers remained, but they appeared to be unavoidable
because the statutory provision, read literally, permitted total
loss of the right to reimbursement on the basis of an allocation
of a small percentage of fault to an employer.37
It is significant to the settlement of tort claims generally
that the Washington Supreme Court refused to accept a literal
reading of the language of the 1986 Tort Reform Act. The stat-
utory language made no reference to the proportion of an
employer's fault to the total fault resulting in injury to a
worker. Instead, it provided that if it was determined that an
employer was "at fault" in a suit under RCW 4.22.070, the
paragraphs creating the department's lien did not apply. The
conclusion that the loss was total was reinforced by the direc-
tion that "benefits shall be paid by the department and/or self-
insurer... as though no recovery had been made from a third
party."' 3 8
The court stated that the question presented in Clark v.
Pacificorp was whether a finding of fault on the part of an
employer reduced the department's right to reimbursement by
the percentage of the employer fault found or whether it
entirely eliminated the department's right to reimbursement.39
The court held that the provision ". . . requires a reduction of
the Department's right to reimbursement in accordance with
38. In 1987, the legislature eliminated the deficiency of notice by enacting a
requirement of notice to the department or to self-insurers, who then could file notices
of interest in the recovery and intervene to protect their statutory interests in the
recovery. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030(2) (1989).
37. See Peck, supra, note 3.
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010(f) (1989); see supra text accompanying note 34
(complete text of statutory provision).
39. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 183, 822 P.2d 162, 170 (1991).
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the employer's share of fault." "0
In support of this nonliteral reading, the court argued that
the reference to RCW 4.22.070 would be superfluous if it were
not meant to require a reduction in proportion to fault.
41 Of
course, if the legislature had intended a reduction in propor-
tion to a fault determination made pursuant to RCW 4.22.070,
it could very easily have so provided expressly rather than
leaving the matter to be determined by inference. Moreover, if
the legislature intended that the department lose only a pro-
portional share of its lien, the legislature should not have gone
on to provide that benefits be paid by the department or a self-
insurer as though no third party recovery had been made. An
inherent weakness in the court's opinion is that there is no
explanation of the legislative purpose in the clause in RCW
51.25.060(1)(f).
The court offers a more acceptable ground for its decision
by arguing that where there is uncertainty after examining the
language of an act, "new legislation should be presumed to be
in line with prior judicial decisions in a field of law."' 4 The
untoward-indeed, one might say unacceptable-consequences
of a literal reading of the provision that had been added to the
Industrial Insurance Act in 1986 were sufficient to create an
uncertainty that the legislature had a deliberate purpose of vis-
iting such a severe loss on employers because of slight fault.43
Just as a reasonable person does not come to a complete halt
when crossing a busy intersection merely because the words
"Don't Walk" appear on a properly posted sign, a court should
avoid calamity resulting from a slavishly literal reading of a
statute.44
The court noted that Washington had adopted comparative
negligence, that it had a policy of protecting state compensa-
tion funds, and that it had a policy of providing adequate com-
pensation, but not full tort damages, in work-related injury
40. Id. at 172, 822 P.2d at 165.
41. Id. at 183, 822 P.2d at 171.
42. Id. at 184, 822 P.2d at 171.
43. Indeed, in one of the cases before the court, the trial judge had stated his
conclusion that the employer must have been at least one percent at fault; this was the
basis for imposing a complete loss of the Department's right to reimbursement! Brief
of Department of Labor and Industries at 2-3, Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167,
822 P.2d 162 (1991) (Nos. 57121-0, 57130-9).
44. "It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of the
makers." Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
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cases.45 The policy of protecting the insurance fund would be
defeated if the right to reimbursement were eliminated; at the
same time, the worker might obtain more than full compensa-
tion. The Tort Reform Act injected an element of fault into
the traditional no-fault workers compensation scheme. Thus, a
narrow construction limiting the effect of an employer's fault
to reduction of the department's lien would create less conflict
than with a no-fault scheme." Limiting the effect of RCW
51.24.060(1)(f) to a proportional reduction 47 of the depart-
ment's lien would protect the compensation fund while assur-
ing a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among
the parties at fault.48 Despite the elegance of the court's analy-
sis, one is left with substantial reason for believing the court
simply rejected the legislature's willingness to impose on the
Workers Compensation Fund rather than on injured workers
the cost of a large part of the relief it gave to third party
defendants.
V. SIGNIFICANCE FOR OTHER TORT CLAIM NEGOTIATIONS
Can a similar rescue operation be performed by construc-
tion of statutory language that, read literally, would have a
devastating effect on the settlement of claims of persons with-
out fault? When consideration is given to the overburdened
court dockets, the need for increasing the number of superior
court judges, the burdens imposed on citizens called for jury
duty, the expense of litigation, and the emotional distress
imposed by trials, it is obvious that negotiated settlement of
tort cases has a social value equivalent to protecting an insur-
ance fund. Negotiated settlement of cases, rather than trial,
has been a traditional method of resolving most disputes, and it
has been used for all but a very small proportion of tort
cases. 4 9 It is unlikely that the legislature intended to create
45. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 184, 822 P.2d at 171.
46. Id. at 186, 822 P.2d at 172.
47. The court describes exactly how to calculate the proportionate reduction. Id.
at 191, 822 P.2d at 175. This information was absent in the court's original opinion. See
supra note 1.
48. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 186, 822 P.2d at 172. The court noted that the purpose
of the Industrial Insurance Act was to furnish sure and certain relief to injured
workers, not full tort damages. Id. at 186 n.9, 822 P.2d at 172 n.9.
49. Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Diputes: Assessing
the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 525, 544-45 (1980-1981); Marc A. Franklin
et al., Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of Economics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1961); Maurice Rosenberg & Michael I. Sovern,
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major obstacles for the settlement of claims of persons without
fault. Indeed, Washington adopted comparative negligence to
facilitate recoveries by injured persons, not to burden fault-
free claimants.50
When the legislature adopted comparative negligence, it
did so with the view that equity in the distribution of liability
between joint and concurrent tortfeasors was a matter for res-
olution by the tortfeasors rather than the injured plaintiff."'
In 1986, the legislature abandoned that view for claimants who
are at fault. In contrast, it did not do so completely for fault-
less claimants. This is evidenced by the express exception pre-
serving joint and several liability of multiple defendants for
faultless claimants. It is further evidenced by the provision
made in the 1986 Act for contribution between defendants sub-
jected to joint and several liability.
The preamble to the 1986 Tort Reform Act states that its
purpose is to create a more equitable distribution of the cost
and risk of injury.52 A conclusion that tortfeasors should have
no responsibility for sharing liabilities with an entity to which
the law has given immunity from liability is understandable
and possibly equitable. Even though in many cases the reasons
for the immunity might not be applicable to the joined
tortfeasors, an immunity suggests that the conduct of the
immune party was not a wrong to the plaintiff.' If one
assumes that a person can be both immune and at fault, it is at
least questionable why others should pay for harm allocable to
an immune party who has no liability to the plaintiff. Like-
wise understandable and arguably equitable is a conclusion
that there is no reason joined tortfeasors should bear a liability
of a defendant with a valid defense against the claim of even
an innocent plaintiff. That defense may have rendered his
Delay and the Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1115, 1124
(1959); ALFRED E. CONARD ET AL., AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT COST AND PAYMENTS 184,
241-42 (1967). See also Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 27-28 (1983).
50. Seattle-First National Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 236,
588 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1978).
51. Id.
52. 1986 Wash. Laws, ch. 305, § 100.
53. If immunity means there was no wrong, there is difficulty in reaching a
conclusion that the immune party was at fault. If the party was not at fault, logically
his conduct should not be part of the total fault.
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otherwise faulty conduct nontortious; therefore it is not a basis
for compensation.
A similar rationale cannot be supplied for faultless claim-
ants who have been injured by joint tortfeasors. In such cases,
the conduct of all tortfeasors is wrongful and a cause in fact of
the plaintiff's injuries. Nevertheless, the statute appears to
exclude from joint and several liability the total percentage of
an innocent plaintiff's damages allocable to a tortfeasor from
joint and several liability if the plaintiff has made a settlement
with that tortfeasor. The statute excludes such liability
regardless of the reasons for making that settlement. A possi-
ble justification for requiring this result is that it is equitable
to require the innocent plaintiff to exercise care and obtain
adequate compensation from a tortfeasor. The statute, how-
ever, contains no provision for determining whether the claim-
ant exercised care and had satisfactory reasons for failing to
obtain more adequate compensation. Prior law provided for a
hearing on whether a settlement was reasonable.54
Relentless pursuit of the theory that a claimant must bear
the costs of his mistakes results in a failure to consider the pre-
dictable effect of exclusion on prompt negotiation of settle-
ments or the predictable involvement and retention of
otherwise unnecessary parties in litigation. Such involvement
entails both emotional costs and litigation expenses. Nor does
the theory give consideration to how long innocent claimants
must wait before receiving any compensation from multiple
tortfeasors. Their liability ultimately could, consistent with
the legislative judgment of equity, be established as joint and
several. They should not have to wait to receive what is equi-
tably due them. Most certainly it was not the legislature's pur-
pose to produce these complications. Indeed, these
consequences probably were not even anticipated or
considered.
The decision in Clark v. Paci~fcorp suggests the possibility
that the court will hold that the Act does not require the
exclusion of shares of damages attributable to defendants who
have settled from judgments imposing joint and several liabil-
ity.' Such a decision would be for as good a cause as that
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1989).
55. Analysis of the statute might proceed along these lines:
The provision of RCW 4.22.070(1) requiring exclusion from judgments of the share
of a claimant's damages attributable to a defendant with whom a claimant has settled
is found in the first paragraph of that section. The purpose of that paragraph is to
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served in Cark, and it would do little more damage to statu-
tory language than did Clark.
The court should not, however, have to perform a salvag-
ing exercise to correct what appears to have been a legislative
error. More hopeful is the possibility that problems in the
Clark opinion will result in corrective legislative action. When
the effects of that decision are felt, both plaintiff and defense
lawyers may argue for statutory change to facilitate negotia-
tions. Their joint effort should have greater credibility than
that enjoyed by the plaintiff's bar in 1986. Indeed, if problems
grow, as may be expected, even the judiciary will have an
interest in making a change.
establish a general rule that the remaining defendants' liabilities shall be several and
not joint. The provision governing claims of parties free from fault is found in a
separate paragraph. A purpose of allowing fault free claimants to proceed generally as
prior to the Act is found in RCW 4.22.070(2). That subsection may be read to provide
that claims for contribution of jointly and severally liable tortfeasors be decided as
they were before enactment of the statute. Indeed, that subsection specifically states,
".... and the effect of settlement by either such defendant, shall be determined under
RCW 4.22.040, 4.22.050, and 4.22.060." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(2) (1989).
Reference to RCW 4.22.040(1) reveals its specific statement: "A right of
contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are jointly and
severally liable upon the same indivisible claim... whether or not judgment has been
recovered against all or any of them." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1989) (emphasis
added).
A conclusion that there should not be a total exclusion of the share of damages
allocable to a defendant with whom a settlement was made would not nullify the 1986
legislation with respect to fault free claimants. The 1986 Act could still be given effect
with respect to their claims by excluding from their recoveries the shares of entities
with immunities, entities with separate defenses, or even entities which for one reason
or another could not be joined as defendants.
Alternatively, the court might note that the provision in RCW 4.22.070(1) is for
exclusion of the shares of "defendants" with whom a claimant has settled, not for
exclusion of settlements made with parties prior to suit or trial. Thus, it could be held
inapplicable to settlements made prior to trial, or at least settlments made prior to
suit.
Accepting this analysis would require tolerance of considerable strain on the
language of the 1986 Act. The strain would not be much greater, however, than that
required to conclude that the legislature did not intend that a finding of any fault on
the part of an employer was to cause the Department of Labor and Industries or a self-
insurer to lose a right to reimbursement.
The analysis falters, in my judgment, because the language of RCW 4.22.070(1)(b)
expressly limits a judgment for joint and several liability to the sum of the
proportionate shares of the defendants against whom the judgment is entered. The
provision of RCW 4.22.070(2) relating to contribution is limited to defendants held
jointly and severally liable under one of the subsections of RCW 4.22.070(1). It thus
does not include persons who were not defendants. In addition, if the legislature had
intended to preserve joint and several liability for innocent claimants, it could have
done so by including such claims within RCW 4.22.070(3), which lists causes of action
that are not affected by the 1986 Tort Reform Act.
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The court said that the language of RCW 4.22.070(1) is
"clear and unambiguous" 56 that "the trier of fact shall deter-
mine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to
every entity which caused the claimant's damages. ' s7 The
word "shall" is presumed to be mandatory. Therefore, the
court held that RCW 51.24.060(1)(f) and RCW 4.22.070 require
a trier of fact to determine the percentage of total fault attrib-
utable to every entity.' The court quoted a law review note:
"mhe only satisfactory method of dealing with multiple
party accidents through comparative negligence is to bring
all the parties into court in a single action, apportion the
fault and then allocate the damages based on this
apportionment.59
The court also said:
Through the adoption of comparative negligence, tort
reform, and the incorporation of these two statutes, we
believe the Legislature intended to bring all entities which
are liable for a claimant's injuries before the court for a
determination of fault before any settlement is reached or
damages are awarded. Bringing all parties before the court
in one fault determination hearing prevents manipulation by
any one party.6°
Apparently out of concern for how these standards might
affect the negotiation process, the court said:
RCW 4.22.070 on its face does not require a full trial to
determine the issue of fault. The words "trier of fact" refer
to a judge; they do not implicate a full trial. We find that an
apportionment of fault between all at-fault entities serves as
a basis for compromise in settlement negotiations. There-
fore our holding does not hamper settlement proceedings.61
The C7ark case was one in which the benefits of making
determinations of fault in a single hearing were particularly
apparent. At the time of the trials, it appeared that by agree-
ing to fix only a small share of fault on the employer, the par-
56. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 181, 822 P.2d 162, 170 (1991).
57. Id. at 181, 822 P.2d at 170 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.070(1) (1989))
(emphasis added by the court in Clark).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 185, 822 P.2d at 172. See also Joel E. Smith & Alan D. Campbell,
Comparative Negligence, 49 WASH. L. REV. 705, 715 (1974).
60. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 186, 822 P.2d at 172.
61. Id. at 191-92, 822 P.2d at 175.
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ties could divide a worker's "savings" from a complete
elimination of the department's "lien" on the third party
recovery. If the percentage of employer fault were kept low,
this could be done at the cost of a slight reduction in the dam-
ages agreed upon and awarded in the worker's recovery on the
third party tort suit. Now that it has been established that
there will be only a proportional reduction of the department's
right to reimbursement, the opportunity for collusion has been
greatly reduced, if not eliminated.62
The facts of the companion case, Whitten, increased the
court's concern for avoiding opportunities for unfair treatment.
In that case, the worker and the third party defendant settled
the case between them prior to the time that the employer's
fault was determined.' The determination made was not
based on evidence presented at a hearing.6 Instead, as men-
tioned above, the trial judge said he believed it was certain that
62. There will be no joint and several liability between an employer and a third
party tort defendant because the employer is an "entity" with immunity to suit by the
worker. Pursuant to the statute, the share of a claimant's damages allocated to an
employer will not be included in the judgment against the third party defendant.
Because tort damages are usually more generous than benefits under the Workers'
Compensation Law, the worker in most cases will not benefit from the proportional
reduction of the department's claim for reimbursement as much as the worker loses in
that proportional reduction of his or her claim against the third party.
63. Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 173-74, 822 P.2d at 166. This would appear to conflict
with the 1987 addition to the statute, which was designed to prevent settlements
without notice to the department. See WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.030(2) (1989). This
addition was made in response to the Insurance Commissioner's Report. See
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER'S REPORT supra note 18. The report notes that the new
subsection (f) of RCW 51.24.060(1) did not require that the department, self-insurers,
or employers be notified that the employer had been identified as an entity to which
fault might be allocated or otherwise make provision for involving them in litigation in
which such an allocation might be made. INsURANCE COMMLSIONER'S REPORT, supra
note 18, at 44.
In Clark, the court held that the purpose of the notice requirement had been met
because in both cases the department had been notified that the injured worker would
pursue a third party claim. 118 Wash. 2d at 179, 822 P.2d at 168-69. That notice is not
the same as notice that the employer will be designated as an entity to which fault
should be allocated. In Clark, the issues concerning fault and elimination of the lien
were not decided when the federal court certified the questions to the Washington
Supreme Court. But in the second of these two consolidated cases, Whitten v. Assoc.
Bldg. Components, the trial court made its finding of fault at the same time it granted
the department's motion to intervene. Id. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
finding of fault and remanded the case for determination of the reimbursement issue.
C/ark, 118 Wash. 2d at 195, 822 P.2d at 177. The decision demonstrates that RCW
51.24.030(2) should be amended to require specific notice that an employer has been
designated an entity to which fault will be allocated.
64. Brief of the Department of Labor and Industries at 13-14, Clark v. Pacificorp,
118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d 162 (1991) (Nos. 571-21-0, 57130-9).
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the employer was at least one percent at fault. It was on
that basis that the department was to lose its entire right to
reimbursement.
Because of these special circumstances, it can be argued
that application of the court's comments about the settlement
process should be limited to cases involving third party tort
claims and the reimbursement rights of the department or a
self-insurer. At one point the court stated its holding was a
consequence of the combined effect of the provision added to
the workers compensation law relating to third party suits and
the general statutory provision relating to allocation of fault.'
Earlier, however, it had stated that its holding was based on a
conclusion that the workers' compensation provision had incor-
porated the provisions relating to allocation of fault.' If so, it
is RCW 4.22.070 that requires that there be only a proportion-
ate reduction in the department's right to reimbursement, and
it is RCW 4.22.070 that provides the basis for the court's analy-
sis of how settlement negotiations must be conducted. The
first statement establishes the decision as applicable to all
negotiations involving RCW 4.22.070 and indicates that it is not
limited to settlements in workers compensation cases. Indeed,
most of the statements made in the opinion refer to settlement
negotiations generally; they are not limited to the facts of the
case. Opportunities for manipulation by one of several parties
will exist in multiparty cases other than those involving work-
ers compensation,67 giving additional reason for concluding
that the court's comments have general applicability.
The reassurance offered that the court's holding will not
hamper settlement proceedings likewise appears to have been
directed to negotiations generally. The court said:"
We find that an apportionment of fault between all at-fault
entities serves as a basis for compromise in settlement nego-
tiations. Therefore our holding does not hamper settlement
proceedings.
The reassurance is not fully satisfying. For example, even
if the words "trier of fact" do not require a full trial for alloca-
65. See C/ark, 118 Wash. 2d at 180-81, 822 P.2d at 169-70.
66. Id. at 180, 822 P.2d at 169.
67. Consider the problems posed by "Mary Carter" agreements. See, e.g., Lumy v.
Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347 (Nev. 1971); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978);
General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 410 A.2d 1039 (Md. 1980).
68. C/ark, 118 Wash. 2d at 191-92, 822 P.2d at 175.
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tions of fault, what will happen if one of the parties, dissatis-
fied with the allocations made, announces that it now desires a
full jury trial? Will participation in the "one fault determina-
tion hearing" constitute an election of remedies or in some
other manner remove allocation issues from the jury trial? Or
will it have a consequence no greater than recognition that set-
tlement efforts have failed?
The basis for compromise, the court said, is to be an alloca-
tion of fault between all at-fault entities, and the allocation is
to be made by the trier of fact, not the parties. The court also
said that the statute reserves the question of percentages of
fault to the trier of fact,69 and, according to the court, it is to be
resolved "in one fault determination hearing" to prevent
manipulation by any one party.70 The court's statement,
quoted above, is that the determination is to be made before
any settlement is reached.7 Does this mean parties should not
undertake to settle a case without involving a "trier of fact"
and participating in a fault allocation hearing?
When triers of fact are involved, are they to insist that
entities other than the parties be joined before attempting to
reach settlement?7 2 Are triers of fact to insist on consideration
of the fault of entities that cannot be identified sufficiently to
permit joinder as parties, such as the phantom car that disap-
peared after causing an accident on a freeway or the person
who left a broken bottle in the sand of a swimming beach?73 Is
the trier of fact to be actively involved in determining the per-
centages of fault and then to approve the allocations made
69. Id. at 181, 822 P.2d at 170.
70. Id. at 186, 822 P.2d at 172.
71. The rigidity of this requirement is suspect, however, given the court's approval
of the settlement made in the companion case, Whitten v. Assoc. Bldg. Components; see
Clark, 118 Wash. 2d at 187, 822 P.2d at 172-73. In that case, the plaintiff had settled
with the defendant prior to the department's intervention in the case and without a
prior fault determination.
72. For example, in an ordinary auto accident case, if the trier of fact believes the
injuries may have been aggravated by a design defect, should the trier of fact insist
upon involvement of the manufacturer of the vehicle? The court states that the
statutory provisions require a trier of fact to determine the percentage of the total
fault attributable to every entity which caused the plaintiff's damages, not merely
those attributable to the parties or entities identified by the parties to a lawsuit. Clark,
118 Wash. 2d at 182, 822 P.2d at 170.
73. See Cornelius J. Peck, Constitutional Challenges to the Partial Rejection and
Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and Several Liability Made by the
1986 Washington Tort Reform Act, 62 WASH. L. REV. 681, 697 (1987).
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before the parties may reach a settlement? How else can triers
of fact prevent manipulation?
Parties may persuade a trier of fact to perform a rubber
stamp after negotiations take place before the trier of fact in a
hearing. Even if the trier of fact adopts such a passive role,
however, a substantial amount of the fact-finder's time will be
required for those hearings.
Are parties who are subject to joint and several liability
and who acknowledge that the claimant is faultless no longer
entitled to make an out-of-court settlement seeking contribu-
tion later from other parties? Prior to the decision in Clark, it
appeared that such a party might do so provided that the set-
tlement released other tortfeasors from liability."4 The court's
statements in Clark appear to preclude that course of action,
relegating parties to the "one fault determination hearing." A
defendant could obtain contribution under RCW 4.22.070(2)
only after entry of a fault allocation judgment. Most persons
contemplating a settlement that releases all tortfeasors, there-
fore, will be unwilling to enter into a settlement without a
prior fault determination. The court's statements cast serious
doubt on the possibility that they could later obtain contribu-
tion from other tortfeasors without that determination.
As mentioned above, defendants have an incentive to go
through trial in the hope that the claimant will be found par-
tially, even though only slightly, at fault. Therefore, absent
other considerations, there probably will not be many occa-
sions upon which a defendant would seek an out-of-court set-
tlement with a fault-free claimant. Perhaps some defendants
will want to eliminate creditors' doubts about their financial
stability. Others may want to have a matter resolved promptly
because of a concern for preserving evidence against other
tortfeasors. Moreover, it is easy to imagine cases in which
there is no chance of allocating fault to a claimant and, yet, the
need for prompt settlement is so great that all would acknowl-
edge it. An example of such a need is a requirement of expen-
sive medical treatment for a child who survived an automobile
accident in which both parents were killed.
A recent Washington Supreme Court decision suggests
74. Harris, supra note 17, at 83-85.
RCW 4.22.040(1) provides that the right to contribution could be enforced either in
the original action against joint tortfeasors or in a separate action brought for that
purpose. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1989).
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that another source of pressure upon defendants' insurers may
induce them to seek prompt settlement of a faultless plaintiff's
claim of joint and several liability. In Industrial Indemnity
Company v. Kallevig7 the Washington Supreme Court held
that a single violation of the unfair claims settlement practices
established by the Washington Insurance Commissioner is a
per se unfair trade practice under the Consumer Protection
Act.76 The consequences of such a violation include liability
for attorney fees and treble damages up to $10,000.1' The
Insurance Commissioner's rules establish as an unfair practice:
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair
and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has
become reasonably clear.... If two or more insurers are
involved, they should arrange to make such payment, leav-
ing to themselves the burden of apportioning it.
78
While there are no cases holding that a third party claim-
ant can recover from an insurance company for a violation of
the commissioner's rules, a strong argument has been made
that such liability should exist.79 The insurance commis-
sioner's rule seems to preclude delay based on a slight chance
that a claimant will be found to be partially at fault. There-
fore, both insurers and claimants may desire a return to a sys-
tem permitting prompt settlement of claims, leaving the
75. 114 Wash. 2d 907, 792 P.2d 520 (1990).
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.010-.86.920 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (1989).
78. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (1990). The commissioner's rules are
promulgated pursuant to R.C.W. 48.30.010(2). They provide:
The following are hereby defined as unfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the business of insurance, specifically
applicable to the settlement of claims:
(5) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time
after proof of loss statements have been completed.
(6) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable
settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear. In
particular, this includes an obligation to effectuate prompt payment of
property damage claims to innocent third parties in clear liability situations.
If two or more insurers are involved, they should arrange to make such
payment, leaving to themselves the burden of apportioning it.
(7) Compelling insureds to institute or submit to litigation, arbitration, or
appraisal to recover amounts due under an insurance policy by offering
substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in such actions or
proceedings.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (1990).
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allocation of liabilities to a later proceeding between
tortfeasors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The 1986 Tort Reform Act appears, at least upon a literal
reading, to have imposed substantial barriers to efficient and
expeditious settlement of claims of parties free from fault
against more than one potential defendant. A prudent fault-
free plaintiff will bring into a lawsuit every party to whom an
allocation of fault is possible without regard for the ability of
those parties to respond to a judgment. In many situations,
such a claimant will lose portions of a possible recovery from a
financially responsible defendant because the claimant finds it
necessary to settle with another defendant on the basis of lia-
bility. This is inconsistent with the Act's objective of providing
an equitable distribution of the costs of injury. Equity would
not cause a partial loss of the deserved compensation because
of pressing financial need.
Poor draftsmanship created a situation in which the
Department of Labor and Industries and self-insurers under
Workers' Compensation could be unfairly deprived of the right
to reimbursement for benefits paid from recoveries made by
workers in third party tort suits. The court's decision in Clark
v. Pacificorp resolved some of the ambiguities and eliminated
some of the flaws in the 1986 Act. 0 Its bold and creative
action avoided unprincipled raids on the Worker's Compensa-
tion Fund. This stirs hope that the court might undertake an
equally important but tactically more difficult task of cor-
recting the Act's very unsatsifactory system for negotiation
and settlement of claims of parties without fault. The court is
not likely to undertake that task. But the directions it has
given for how negotiations must proceed under the Act should
lead to legislative reconsideration of the provisions causing
those difficulties. The complications of the negotiation of set-
tlement of cases involving a fault-free claimant and multiple
tortfeasors may lead plaintiff attorneys, defense attorneys,
insurers, and even judges to seek legislative relief.
One of the provisions deserving reconsideration is that
which requires a trier to fact to make allocations of fault in all
cases, both those tried and those settled, to establish the joint
80. Clark v. Pacificorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 182, 822 P.2d 162, 170 (1991).
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and several liability of multiple tortfeasors. Another is the
provision that apparently requires that all damages proportion-
ate to the share of fault allocable to a joint tortfeasor with
whom a claimant has settled be excluded from a judgment
later entered against the other tortfeasors. If the legislature
eliminated these requirements, negotiation of settlements for
fault-free claimants could proceed much as they did prior to
enactment of the 1986 Tort Reform Act.
